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Notes 
NEXT FRIEND STANDING AND THE WAR ON 
TERROR 
CAROLINE NASRALLAH BELK 
INTRODUCTION 
Three years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
nearly six hundred men remain imprisoned at the U.S. Naval Base at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.1 During this time they have existed in a state 
of legal limbo, held for questioning about terrorist activity, but with 
no charges filed against them and no knowledge of when the 
interrogations might end.2 The United States government refuses to 
reveal even their identities.3 On the surface, the conditions at 
Guantanamo Bay seem adequate: the prisoners receive three hot 
meals daily, copies of the Koran, and medical treatment, and 
loudspeakers lead Muslim prayers five times a day.4 The uncertainty 
 
Copyright © 2004 by Caroline Nasrallah Belk. 
 1. At last count there were 585 inmates. US Fights Hostile Reaction to Guantanamo ‘War 
on Terror’ Detentions, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 5, 2004, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Agence 
France Presse File. 
 2. In August 2004, the U.S. military initiated hearings to determine whether each detainee 
was being properly held as an “enemy combatant.” Guantanamo Detainees Boycott “Enemy 
Combatant” Hearings, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 4, 2004, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Agence 
France Presse File. For these administrative hearings, the military will give the detainees access 
to the unclassified information relating to their detentions, but not to any classified information. 
Id. It will also provide them with a “personal representative” for assistance, but not with lawyers 
or other advocates. George Edmonson, Pentagon to Review Detainees in Cuba, THE ATLANTA 
JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, July 17, 2004, at A3. Earlier this year, the military showed signs of 
expanding its use of interrogations at Guantanamo Bay. For example, although the current 
facilities have free space to accommodate up to 350 additional prisoners, the military has 
contracted to build an additional camp that could accommodate up to 100 more. This new 
facility will also contain advanced interrogation rooms. M. Horrock & Anwar Iqbal, Waiting for 
Gitmo, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 28, 2004, at E1. 
 3. Identities have not been released, and reporters observing the administrative hearings 
will not be allowed to identify any of the inmates. Guantanamo Detainees Boycott “Enemy 
Combatant” Hearings, supra note 2. 
 4. Horrock & Iqbal, supra note 2. There have been allegations of abuse. See, e.g., Vikram 
Dodd & Tania Branigan, Questioned at Gunpoint, Shackled, Forced to Pose Naked. British 
Detainees Tell Their Stories of Guantanamo Bay, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 4, 2004, at 1; Fergus 
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surrounding their fate, however, has caused a considerable amount of 
stress and has been blamed for over thirty suicide attempts.5 The 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), normally silent 
about all but the most severe problems, spoke out in October 2003 to 
complain that the “lengthy detention without hope, trial, charges or 
human contact outside of guards or interrogators has caused ‘a 
worrying deterioration’ in the prisoners’ mental health.”6 Some 
international experts have alleged that U.S. allies, such as the 
Australian and British governments, have been more successful at 
pressing the United States for action regarding their citizens held at 
Guantanamo Bay, although the United States rejects the assertion of 
preferential treatment.7 
Family members, attorneys, and concerned citizens have 
attempted to bring legal resolution to the prisoners’ fates by filing 
habeas corpus petitions for them in the federal courts.8 One of the 
 
Shiel, Hicks and Habib Abused, Allege Ex-Inmates, THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Aug. 5, 
2004, at 1. 
 5. Horrock & Iqbal, supra note 2. The official count stands at thirty-two, but officials have 
switched from tracking suicide attempts to tracking instances of “manipulative self-injurious 
behavior.” Tania Branigan & Vikram Dodd, Fight Against Terror: Afghanistan to Guantanamo 
Bay—The Story of Three British Detainees, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 4, 2004, at 5. A report titled 
“Detention in Afghanistan and Guantanamo,” authored by the lawyers for three British 
detainees released in March 2004, alleges that the true suicide count reaches “several  
hundred.” Id. 
 6. Horrock & Iqbal, supra note 2. ICRC President Jakob Kellenberger took the 
organization’s concerns to U.S. officials in January 2004, lamenting the “seemingly indefinite 
detention” of the Guantanamo detainees and “not[ing] that the ICRC’s concerns regarding 
certain aspects of the conditions and treatment in Guantanamo have not yet been adequately 
addressed.” Press Release, International Committee of the Red Cross, United States: ICRC 
President Urges Progress on Detention-Related Issues (Jan. 16, 2004), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList74/774F1B35A7E20CC9C1256E1D007741C1. 
 7. John Mintz, U.S. Faces Quandary in Freeing Detainees, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2004, at 
A1. Of the six detainees for whom military tribunals had been authorized in March 2004, two 
were British and one was Australian. Horrock & Iqbal, supra note 2. Of the nine British men in 
custody at that time, five had been released and two of the four who remained in detention were 
scheduled to face military tribunals. Id. Australian David Hicks will also face a military tribunal. 
Terror Suspect Will Get Day in Court, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2004, at A4. The United States has 
returned 134 detainees of various nationalities since the Guantanamo Bay facility opened in 
January 2002, but nearly 600 detainees remain. U.S. Releases 15 More from Guantanamo, L.A. 
TIMES, Apr. 3, 2004, at A16. Most recently, four Frenchmen were released to French authorities 
in late July 2004, Elaine Sciolino, Four Terror Suspects Returned to France, HOUSTON CHRON., 
July 28, 2004, at 13, and five Moroccans were returned to Morocco in August 2004, News: 
Around the World, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 3, 2004, at 10. 
 8. See, e.g., Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003) (habeas corpus petition 
brought by detainee’s attorney), rev’d, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004); Coalition of Clergy, Lawyers, and 
Professors v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002) (habeas corpus petition brought by a coalition 
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obstacles these litigants have faced involves a little-known, technical 
doctrine called “next friend standing.”9 Next friend standing allows a 
third person to file a claim in court on behalf of someone who is 
unable to file on his or her own. For decades, litigants have 
predominantly asserted next friend standing to bring habeas corpus 
petitions on behalf of state criminal inmates in attempts to overturn 
convictions or block imposition of the death penalty. In these cases, 
which raise issues of federalism and interference with state criminal 
convictions, courts are especially concerned with preventing anti–
death penalty activists from filing claims to pursue political goals.10 
The petitions of the Guantanamo Bay prisoners, however, are very 
different: they are not seeking review of state court judgments but are 
instead requesting that an impartial tribunal perform some kind of 
review in the first instance.11 Their cases raise questions of separation 
of powers and deference to the political branches in time of war. 
Although the concerns surrounding the petitions of the 
Guantanamo Bay prisoners differ greatly from those in the state 
criminal-conviction context, the courts have applied the same rules 
for habeas corpus petitions in both circumstances—specifically, the 
doctrine of next friend standing. In the military cases, however, the 
need for judicial relief is in line with the original purpose of the writ 
of habeas corpus—to ensure that the government has just cause for 
the confinement—and next friend standing should be applied more 
liberally. 
 
of concerned professors, clergy, and lawyers), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2073 (2003); Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld (Hamdi II), 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002) (habeas corpus petition brought by 
detainee’s father); Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002) (habeas corpus petitions 
brought by various family members), aff’d sub nom. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 
(D.C. Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). 
 9. See infra notes 12–17 and accompanying text (explaining the uses and origins of the 
doctrine); see also RONALD P. SOKOL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 55–56 (2d ed. 1969) (“The 
practice of having next of friend applications is not common, but it is occasionally useful and 
sometimes necessary.”). 
 10. See, e.g., Hauser ex rel. Crawford v. Moore, 223 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting 
“reservations” that a prisoner’s would-be next friends were not acting in his best interests but 
only out of “their own desires to block imposition of the death penalty in an ‘attempt to define 
justice as they [saw] fit’”). 
 11. See, e.g., Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 58 (“Plaintiffs . . . ask this Court to enter a 
preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting the government from refusing to allow the 
Kuwaiti nationals to ‘meet with their families,’ ‘be informed of the charges, if any, against them,’ 
‘designate and consult with counsel of their choice,’ and ‘have access to the courts or some other 
impartial tribunal.’” (citations omitted)). 
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This Note argues that the current rule of next friend standing, 
developed in reaction to specific problems of state death row appeals, 
will be adequate to deal with the habeas corpus petitions of military 
prisoners only if the courts continue to consider the underlying goals 
of both the writ of habeas corpus and next friend standing. Part I 
highlights the history of habeas corpus and the current two-pronged 
rule for next friend standing. Part II discusses recent cases arising out 
of the military response to the September 11 attacks in which next 
friend standing has been an issue. Part III looks at the first prong of 
the test for next friend standing and argues that a person detained by 
the military need not be held completely incommunicado to warrant a 
finding of inaccessibility. Specifically, when the government’s actions 
contribute to the detainee’s inability to secure other avenues of relief, 
this should contribute to a finding of inaccessibility. Part IV argues 
that in assessing the second prong of the test for next friend standing, 
a significant relationship should not be required in evaluating the 
appropriateness of a would-be next friend but should instead be only 
one factor. 
I.  HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF NEXT FRIEND STANDING 
Next friend standing, which dates back to English common law, 
was originally created as a procedural device by which detained or 
imprisoned persons could challenge the validity of their confinement 
through the writ of habeas corpus.12 It was recognized that detained 
persons were often unable to sign their own petitions for relief, so 
third persons, acting on behalf of the detainees, were allowed to bring 
the writ.13 Today, next friend standing still provides access to judicial 
review to persons who are unable to bring cases on their own 
behalves. The common law doctrine of next friend standing is often 
invoked when the real party in interest has some disability, such as 
mental disability or minority, which inhibits access to the court.14 The 
most popular use of next friend standing, however, is in the context of 
 
 12. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 162 (1990). 
 13. United States ex rel. Bryant v. Houston, 273 F. 915, 916 (2d Cir. 1921). 
 14. See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Craig, 81 F. 320, 320 (3d Cir. 1897) (real party in interest was a 
minor child); In re Kronberg, 208 F. 203, 205 (E.D. Ark. 1913) (real party in interest was non 
compos mentis); Garnett v. Garnett, 114 Mass. 379, 380 (1874) (real party in interest was 
insane); see also Hoston v. Silbert, 681 F.2d 876, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (real party in interest was 
deceased). 
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habeas corpus petitions; the federal habeas corpus statute,15 as well as 
many state constitutions and statutes,16 explicitly authorize next friend 
standing for imprisoned persons who are physically inaccessible to the 
court. This Part first describes the history of the writ of habeas 
corpus, focusing on recent efforts to limit its availability. This Part 
then outlines the doctrine of next friend standing and presents the 
current test for next friend standing, as pronounced by the Supreme 
Court in Whitmore v. Arkansas.17 
A. Habeas Corpus: The Greatly Abused Writ 
The writ of habeas corpus, which traces its roots to the Magna 
Carta,18 developed centuries ago as a check on the exercise of 
executive power against the individual.19 It is widely referred to as the 
“the Great Writ”—indeed, Blackstone characterized it as “the most 
celebrated writ in the English law.”20 It is a challenge to government 
custody and underscores the fundamental importance of freedom 
from unlawful physical restraint. The goal of habeas corpus is not just 
to release the prisoner, but to ensure due process of law.21 If a court 
grants a habeas corpus petition, the government must produce the 
 
 15. See 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (2000) (“Application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be in writing 
signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his 
behalf.”). 
 16. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (“Each justice of the Supreme Court may issue writs 
of habeas corpus to any part of the State upon petition by or on behalf of a person held in actual 
custody . . . .”); ALA. CODE § 15-21-4 (1975) (“Application for a writ of habeas corpus must be 
made by petition, signed either by the party himself for whose benefit it is intended or by some 
other person on his behalf . . . .”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-45-101 (2003) (“If any person is 
committed or detained for any criminal or supposed criminal matter, it is lawful for him to apply 
to the supreme or district courts for a writ of habeas corpus, which application shall be in writing 
and signed by the prisoner or some person on his behalf . . . .”); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-14-4 (1993) 
(“The petition for the writ of habeas corpus must be verified by the oath of the applicant or 
some other person in his behalf.”). 
 17. 495 U.S. 149, 163–64 (1990). 
 18. Sec’y of State for Home Affairs v. O’Brien, [1923] A.C. 603, 646 (appeal taken from 
K.B.) (Lord Shaw’s opinion); The King v. Halliday, [1917] A.C. 260, 272 (appeal taken from 
K.B.) (Lord Atkinson’s opinion). 
 19. See Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 101 (1868) (stating that the intent of the writ 
of habeas corpus “is that every citizen may be protected by judicial action from unlawful 
imprisonment”). 
 20. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129. 
 21. 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4261 
(2d ed. 1988). 
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prisoner so the court can consider the lawfulness of the confinement.22 
The Supreme Court has described the writ as both a symbol of 
individual liberty and the best defense of personal freedom.23 The writ 
also recognizes that true freedom means individuals must know the 
certainty of their legal status. It is precisely the sort of “legal limbo” 
created by custody without charge that habeas corpus is designed to 
avoid. 
The writ and the ability to petition through a third party are well 
established in American law.24 The writ’s importance is evidenced in 
the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits suspension of the writ except 
when Congress determines that “in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion 
the Public Safety may require it.”25 American courts allowed next 
friends to bring habeas corpus petitions for at least a century26 before 
Congress amended the habeas corpus statute in 1948 to permit 
explicitly “someone acting in [the prisoner’s] behalf” to sign and 
verify applications.27 This uncontroversial change merely formalized 
the availability of next friend standing and was enacted to “follow[] 
the actual practice of the courts.”28 
 
 22. SOKOL, supra note 9, at 36–37. The court may inquire into the lawfulness of the 
confinement without requiring the government to produce the person in court, for example 
when lawfulness turns solely on questions of law. In this case, the court would not actually grant 
the writ but, in finding the confinement unlawful, would grant the relief requested in the 
petition for the writ. Id. 
 23. Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 95 (“The great writ of habeas corpus has been for centuries 
esteemed the best and only sufficient defence of personal freedom.”); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 
54, 66 (1968) (“[The writ] is not now and never has been a static, narrow, formalistic remedy; its 
scope has grown to achieve its grand purpose—the protection of individuals against erosion of 
their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty.” (citation omitted) (alteration 
in original)). 
 24. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Funaro v. Watchorn, 164 F. 152, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1908): 
[I]t has been the frequent practice in this district to present habeas corpus petitions in 
deportation cases signed and verified by others than the person detained. In such 
cases, often for lack of time, as well as because of infancy or incompetency, it would 
be impossible to present a petition signed and verified by the person detained . . . . 
 25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. At the time of the founding, the constitutions of several states 
also provided some form of suspension clause. BADSHAH K. MIAN, AMERICAN HABEAS 
CORPUS: LAW, HISTORY, AND POLITICS 73 (1984). The writ was last suspended during the Civil 
War. Habeas Corpus Suspension Act of 1863, Act of March 3, 1863, c.81, §§ 1, 4, 12 Stat. 755, 
756. 
 26. For example, in 1843, next friends were allowed to file habeas corpus petitions on 
behalf of minors who had unlawfully enlisted in the U.S. military. In re Keeler, 14 F. Cas. 173, 
174 (D. Ark. 1843) (No. 7,637). 
 27. Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 2242, 62 Stat. 869, 965 (1948) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2242 
(2000)). 
 28. 28 U.S.C. § 2242 revision note (2000). 
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Although habeas corpus relief has been available to federal 
prisoners since the Judiciary Act of 1789,29 it was not until 1867 that 
state prisoners were allowed to secure habeas corpus relief in federal 
court by showing that their custody violated the U.S. Constitution or 
federal law.30 In the 1950s and 1960s, the Warren Court significantly 
expanded the rights of state prisoners to seek federal habeas corpus 
review.31 Although the Burger and Rehnquist Courts halted this 
expansion and in some situations even retracted it, many 
commentators continued to argue that the availability of federal 
habeas corpus review was too broad.32 For instance, there had never 
been a statute of limitations for filing habeas corpus petitions, and it 
was generally understood that the principles of res judicata did not 
apply.33 A leading treatise deemed federal habeas corpus review of 
state criminal convictions “[t]he most controversial and friction-
producing issue in the relation between the federal courts and the 
states.”34 Its wide availability was seen as opening the floodgates to 
last-minute appeals by death row inmates seeking only to postpone 
their execution dates, thus interfering with the ability of states to 
carry out executions.35 In addition, state courts resented the review of 
their decisions by federal judges.36 One exasperated federal judge 
finally wrote in a filed opinion that “applications for The Great Writ 
have become so inappropriately routine and commonplace in criminal 
litigation today that some might understandably refer to it as the 
‘Great(ly Abused) Writ.’”37 
 
 29. Ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81 (1789). 
 30. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385. 
 31. Burke W. Kappler, Small Favors: Chapter 154 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act, the States, and the Right to Counsel, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 469, 475 
(2000). Justice Frankfurter, in his concurrence in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), concluded 
that federal courts hearing habeas corpus appeals by state prisoners need not give deference to 
state courts on questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact. Id. at 504–09. The case has 
come to stand for this proposition. Kappler, supra, at 475. In Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 
(1963), the Court held that only a deliberate omission of a claim on direct state or in-state post 
conviction review would preclude federal review of that claim. 
 32. Kappler, supra note 31, at 476–84 (describing the case history, the academic debate on 
the issues, and the ensuing reforms adopted by Congress in the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)). 
 33. SOKOL, supra note 9, at 156–59. 
 34. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 4261. 
 35. Kappler, supra note 31, at 478. 
 36. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 4261. 
 37. Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348, 365 (1978) (Hill, J., specially concurring). The 
opinion goes on to lament the “piecemeal presentation of endless applications for the writ of 
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In response to this frustration, Congress enacted in 1996 the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).38 The law 
was designed to increase the powers of law enforcement after the 
Oklahoma City terrorist bombing, but it also contains provisions that 
significantly restrict the availability of federal habeas corpus review 
for state prisoners.39 The AEDPA establishes a one-year statute of 
limitations on filing a petition,40 limits the violations for which review 
is allowed,41 and tightens the state-remedy exhaustion requirement.42 
An additional piece of legislation, the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,43 restricts the ability of 
criminal immigrants to file habeas corpus petitions to review 
deportation orders.44 
B. Next Friend Standing 
The doctrine of next friend standing permits persons unable to 
prosecute their own actions—the “real parties in interest”—to have 
third persons—“next friends”—stand in for them.45 The doctrine 
 
habeas corpus” that has thwarted the “needs of society for some semblance of finality in the 
administration of criminal justice” and calls for a rule of complete exhaustion of all state relief 
before the writ can be sought in federal court. Id. at 365. 
 38. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244–2261 (2000)); 
see also Kappler, supra note 31, at 486–88 (describing the legislative history of the AEDPA). 
 39. Kappler, supra note 31, at 469. 
 40. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (2000). 
 41. Id. § 2254; see also Kappler, supra note 31, at 471: 
To win federal habeas relief for a state conviction, a petitioner must show that the 
state’s adjudication resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States; or that resulted in a decision that was based on 
an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 
State court proceeding. 
 42. 28 U.S.C. § 2261; see also Kappler, supra note 31, at 470–71 (“Generally, a state 
prisoner may only seek federal habeas corpus review for violations of the Constitution, laws, or 
treaties of the United States, and can only do so after exhausting all state remedies.”). 
 43. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
8 U.S.C.). 
 44. Matthew J. Droskoski, Casebrief, Issues In The Third Circuit: Criminal Aliens Get 
Pinched: Sandoval v. Reno, AEDPA’s And IIRIRA’s Effect On Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, 45 
VILL. L. REV. 711, 717–18 (2000). 
 45. See generally SOKOL, supra note 9, at 55–56. Relatively little has been written about 
this doctrine in its own right. Scholars have addressed their concerns toward the underlying 
substantive issues of habeas corpus, such as ensuring that capital defendants are given adequate 
appeals, and they have discussed this doctrine only as a tangential issue. See, e.g., Carol A. 
Fitzsimmons, Whitmore v. Arkansas: Execution of an Individual, Without a Prior Mandatory 
Appellate Review, Denied Scrutiny, 18 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 203, 215–
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dates back to the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, which allowed 
the filing of the writ of habeas corpus by anyone acting on behalf of a 
detained person.46 In 1704 the House of Lords announced “[t]hat 
every Englishman, who is imprisoned by any authority whatsoever, 
has an undoubted right, by his agents, or friends, to apply for, and 
obtain a Writ of Habeas Corpus, in order to procure his liberty by due 
course of law.”47 Courts have recognized the availability of next friend 
standing as necessary in the interests of “liberty”48 and as “ancient 
and fully accepted.”49 
In U.S. courts, next friend standing is authorized by common law 
and, in the context of habeas corpus proceedings, by statute.50 In both 
contexts, “next friends” with no claimed injuries of their own can 
bring suit on behalf of persons with qualifying injuries who are unable 
to prosecute their own actions. Next friend standing constitutes an 
exception to traditional standing rules, which generally require that 
litigants bring suit only for their own injuries and prohibit suits on 
behalf of third parties.51 
Standing doctrine consists of both constitutional requirements, 
which are designed to ensure that the courts hear only “cases and 
controversies” as required by Article III of the U.S. Constitution, and 
prudential requirements imposed by the courts.52 The general 
prohibition against suits brought on behalf of third parties is largely 
prudential, which means that the courts and Congress may fashion 
 
17 (1992). Admittedly, the substantive issues in habeas corpus proceedings are generally more 
fundamental and far-reaching, and, in comparison, the doctrine of next friend standing is a 
relatively minor technicality. Given, however, that this threshold issue must be passed before a 
court will address the fundamental issues, it warrants more attention than it has received. 
 46. 31 Car. 2, c. 2, § 2 (Eng.). 
 47. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 162 (1990) (citation omitted) (alteration in 
original). 
 48. See King v. McLean Asylum (McLean Asylum I), 64 F. 325, 328 (1st Cir. 1894) (stating 
that “[i]n favor of liberty” the court should “admit the prochein ami [next friend]” and that “the 
aid of a prochein ami . . . is necessary for the protection of those who, on account of the rigorous 
nature of their detention, or of their mental ability, are incapable of acting for themselves”). 
 49. United States ex rel. Bryant v. Houston, 273 F. 915, 916 (2d Cir. 1921). 
 50. 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (2000). 
 51. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (“[T]he plaintiff generally must assert his 
own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests 
of third parties.”). 
 52. Generally, Article III limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to cases and 
controversies. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Standing doctrine, together with other doctrines such as 
mootness and ripeness, ensures that Article III requirements are met in all cases, and also 
includes other, prudential limitations on the federal courts’ authority. 
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exceptions, such as next friend standing and third-party standing.53 
Though based on Article III concerns,54 the prohibition is essentially 
an exercise of judicial self-restraint.55 It manifests a general preference 
for plaintiffs who have personal stakes in the outcome of cases to 
ensure that courts properly resolve the issues presented. 56 
The preference for plaintiffs with a personal stake in the case has 
become an important aspect of the law of next friend standing. The 
courts have long worried that next friends without this personal stake 
may fail to act in the best interests of those whom they purport to 
represent.57 The courts applying the rules of next friend standing 
recognize that “[i]t was not intended that the writ of habeas corpus 
should be availed of, as a matter of course, by intruders or uninvited 
meddlers, styling themselves next friends.”58 
1. The Whitmore Rule of Next Friend Standing. In 1990, the 
Supreme Court decided Whitmore v. Arkansas59 and set out the 
current rule for next friend standing. There are two requirements to 
properly assert such standing: (1) the “‘next friend’ must provide an 
adequate explanation—such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, 
or other disability—why the real party in interest cannot appear on 
his own behalf to prosecute the action;”60 and (2) “the ‘next friend’ 
must be truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose 
behalf he seeks to litigate, and it has been further suggested that a 
 
 53. In most third-party claims, the litigant has come to court to redress individual injury as 
well as the injury of a third party, and it is for these latter claims that the litigant must seek 
third-party standing. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 629 (1991). With next 
friend standing, however, the litigant has no individual injury and seeks only to assist someone 
else in redressing that person’s injury. By nature of the circumstances, a next friend has no 
personal injury and acts only as a “mouthpiece” of sorts for the real party in interest. Because 
the limits on third-party and next friend standing are prudential, Congress can authorize third-
party and next friend standing by statute. Warth, 422 U.S. at 501; see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2242 
(authorizing next friend standing in the habeas corpus statute). 
 54. See Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 164 (noting that parties might attempt to use next friend 
standing to “circumvent the jurisdictional limits of Art. III”); see also Warth, 422 U.S. at 499 
(stating that the prohibition on third-party standing is “closely related to Art. III concerns”). 
 55. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500. 
 56. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1994). 
 57. See, e.g., King v. McLean Asylum (McLean Asylum II), 64 F. 331, 356 (1st Cir. 1894) 
(discussing, with approval, the rule that “next friends” must establish that they act for the 
benefit of the real parties in interest and not merely to promote their own causes). 
 58. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 164 (alteration in original) (quoting United States ex rel. Bryant 
v. Houston, 273 F. 915, 916 (2d Cir. 1921)). 
 59. 495 U.S. 149. 
 60. Id. at 163. 
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‘next friend’ must have some significant relationship with the real 
party in interest.”61 The burden is on the “next friend” to justify her 
status and, thereby, the jurisdiction of the federal courts.62 
In Whitmore, the real party in interest was Ronald Gene 
Simmons. Simmons had been sentenced to death twice for two 
separate murders.63 In each case, Simmons waived his right to appeal 
his sentence, and the State of Arkansas found him competent to do 
so.64 Another death row inmate, Jonas Whitmore, requested 
permission of the Supreme Court of Arkansas to intervene in the 
Simmons case as a third party with his own claims and also to 
intervene on Simmons’ behalf as his next friend to take up Simmons’ 
appeal.65 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that Whitmore did not 
have next friend standing,66 and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed.67 
Whitmore had not brought a habeas corpus petition on Simmons’ 
behalf but instead had sought to intervene in a state court 
proceeding.68 The Supreme Court of Arkansas recognized the 
availability of “next friend” standing under state law but denied such 
standing to Whitmore.69 Although there was no congressional 
authorization for asserting such standing in a federal court, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that a federal common law doctrine of next 
friend standing existed and was “no broader than what is permitted 
by the habeas corpus statute.”70 Because Whitmore was unable to 
demonstrate that Simmons had a disability that prevented him from 
bringing his own appeal, Whitmore’s assertion of next-friend standing 
failed and the writ of certiorari was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.71 
2. Next Friend Standing and Article III’s “Cases and 
Controversies” Requirement. The Whitmore decision reiterated that 
the general doctrine of standing serves to limit the jurisdiction of 
 
 61. Id. at 163–64 (citation omitted). 
 62. Id. at 164. 
 63. Id. at 151–53. 
 64. Id. at 152–53. 
 65. Id. at 153–54, 164–65. 
 66. Id. at 153. 
 67. Id. at 166. 
 68. Id. at 164. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 164–65. 
 71. Id. at 165–66. 
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federal courts to the “cases or controversies” allowed by Article III.72 
The Court expressed concern that suits by “next friends” with only a 
generalized interest in the case could circumvent the jurisdictional 
limits imposed by Article III.73 Despite this reference to Article III, 
the Whitmore discussion of next friend standing does not render the 
limitations on next friend standing a constitutional requirement. In 
fact, the Court stated that its next friend standing rule derived from 
“[d]ecisions applying the habeas corpus statute.”74 For the most part, 
the Whitmore decision merely reaffirms the rule that the courts had 
used previously.75 
The cases preceding Whitmore did not turn on Article III, except 
to the extent they required that the real party in interest meet 
constitutional requirements and that the parties not otherwise 
circumvent Article III limits. Consequently, it is more appropriate to 
think of next friend standing requirements as prudential limitations, 
which can be changed by statute or may evolve with the common 
law.76 The Court’s concern with avoiding next friends who have only a 
generalized interest in the case relates to Article III requirements,77 
but the exact content of the rule achieving this result remains a 
product of common law.78 
 
 72. Id. at 154–55. 
 73. Id. at 164; see also Gusman v. Marrero, 180 U.S. 81, 87 (1901) (holding that friendliness 
and sympathy for the “doomed man” and concern about unconstitutional laws do not create a 
cause of action). 
 74. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163. The habeas corpus statute itself does not include any 
requirements for asserting next friend standing. 
 75. See, e.g., Weber v. Garza, 570 F.2d 511, 513–14 (5th Cir. 1978) (stating the rule that 
would-be next friends must establish why the prisoners on whose behalves they act could not 
sign their own habeas corpus petitions, and also requiring that the next friends explain their 
relationship to and interest in the prisoners); United States ex rel. Bryant v. Houston, 273 F. 915, 
916 (2d Cir. 1921) (stating that the would-be next friend must show the detainee has some 
disability and also demonstrate “who the ‘next friend’ is”). 
 76. Importantly, Congress authorized next friend standing by statute when it amended 28 
U.S.C. § 2242 in 1948. Judicial Code and Procedure Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, Ch. 646, § 
2242, 62 Stat. 869, 965 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (2000)). Prudential limitations 
on Article III jurisdiction may be changed by Congress, but constitutional limitations cannot. 
 77. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 164. 
 78. Id. at 177 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The requirements for next-friend standing are 
creations of common law, not of the Constitution.”). Importantly, the doctrine of next friend 
standing predates the U.S. Constitution. 
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II.  THE RECENT RESURGENCE OF NEXT FRIEND STANDING FOR 
CHALLENGES TO MILITARY CUSTODY 
Given the recent resurgence of next friend standing asserted in 
challenges to military custody in the wake of the September 11 
attacks, it is worth examining in detail how the courts have applied 
the prongs of the Whitmore rule—developed in a criminal context—in 
the military context. The Whitmore rule sets out a staged analysis that 
requires a court to determine, first, whether a next friend is necessary, 
and, second, whether the would-be next friend is an appropriate one. 
This section discusses three representative cases: (1) the habeas 
corpus petition of Yaser Esam Hamdi brought by his father; (2) the 
habeas corpus petition of Jose Padilla brought by his attorney; and (3) 
the habeas corpus petitions of all detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba, brought by a “Coalition of Clergy, Lawyers, and Professors.” 
For the first prong of the Whitmore test,79 the citizenship of the 
detainee is an important factor. The courts have consistently found 
that enemy combatants who are U.S. citizens and who are held by the 
military are “inaccessible” under the first prong. In contrast, the 
courts disagree as to whether detainees who are not U.S. citizens or 
residents are “inaccessible.” For the second prong of Whitmore,80 
courts have struggled to delineate how a would-be next friend 
satisfies the requirements. Specifically, the opinions have centered on 
the question of what type of “significant relationship” is needed to 
show that the next friend is acting in the detainee’s best interests 
rather than as an intruder or uninvited meddler. 
A. Yaser Esam Hamdi 
Yaser Esam Hamdi was captured in Afghanistan during the fall 
of 2001, when the United States overthrew that country’s Taliban 
regime.81 Shortly after transferring Hamdi to the U.S. Naval Base at 
 
 79.  Id. at 163 (“[A] ‘next friend’ must provide an adequate explanation—such as 
inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability—why the real party in interest cannot 
appear on his own behalf to prosecute the action.”). 
 80. Id. at 163–64 (“[T]he ‘next friend’ must be truly dedicated to the best interests of the 
person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate . . . and it has been further suggested that the ‘next 
friend’ must have some significant relationship with the real party in interest.”). 
 81. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi II), 296 F.3d 278, 280 (4th Cir. 2002), rev’d, 316 F.3d 450 
(4th Cir. 2003), vacated by 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004), remanded to 378 F.3d 426 (4th Cir. 2004). 
When the Supreme Court heard Hamdi’s case, it decided he must be given the ability to 
challege his confinement before an impartial tribunal. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 123 S. Ct. 2633, 2635 
(2004). Pursuant to this decision, the U.S. government agreed to release him to the custody of 
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Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the military learned that he was a U.S. 
citizen, born in Louisiana, and that he may not have renounced his 
citizenship.82 In April 2002, Hamdi was transferred from Cuba to the 
Norfolk Naval Station Brig in Norfolk, Virginia, where the 
government held him as an enemy combatant.83 The federal public 
defender for the Eastern District of Virginia, Frank Dunham, filed a 
habeas corpus petition on Hamdi’s behalf, naming himself as next 
friend.84 The district court found the petition to be properly filed “in 
the interest of justice” and determined that “technical issues 
regarding who [was] best situated to be next friend [would] not be 
allowed to interfere with having the ‘mind of the public be put at rest’ 
by a swift resolution of the substance of this petition.”85 While that 
decision was on appeal, Hamdi’s father, Esam Fouad Hamdi, filed a 
separate writ of habeas corpus for his son, naming himself next 
friend.86 The district court allowed the father’s petition to proceed and 
appointed Dunham as counsel.87 
On appeal, the standing issue turned on the existence of a 
“significant relationship” with the prisoner. The Fourth Circuit 
affirmed the validity of Esam Fouad Hamdi’s petition brought on 
behalf of his son and concluded that Dunham’s petition should be 
dismissed.88 It was undisputed that Hamdi was sufficiently inaccessible 
under the first prong of the Whitmore test.89 In considering the second 
prong, however, the court of appeals concluded that only Hamdi’s 
father could claim next friend standing because he was the only 
litigant who could show a “significant relationship” with the real party 
in interest.90 The court read Whitmore as requiring a significant 
relationship between the would-be next friend and the real party in 
interest for two reasons. First, this requirement was the only way to 
 
Saudi Arabia. Morning Edition (NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 23, 2004), available at 2004 WL 
56914919. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi I), 294 F.3d 598, 601–02 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting the district 
court). 
 86. Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 280. 
 87. Id. at 281. 
 88. Hamdi I, 294 F.3d at 607. The court also dismissed another, unrelated petition filed by a 
concerned citizen from New Jersey. Id. 
 89. Id. at 603. 
 90. Id. at 606–07. 
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avoid “opening the floodgates . . . to the very ‘intruders or uninvited 
meddlers’” about whom the Whitmore Court had expressed concern.91 
Although the Fourth Circuit did not doubt Dunham’s sincerity or his 
dedication to Hamdi’s best interests, it expressed an inability to 
distinguish a public defender from “someone who seeks simply to 
gain attention by injecting himself into a high-profile case.”92 
Additionally, because some districts do not have a public defender, 
and because a prisoner might see even a public defender as an 
intruder, there was no basis to treat a public defender differently from 
any other concerned citizen.93 
A second and related reason for the significant relationship 
requirement, according to the Fourth Circuit, was the desire to stay 
true to the jurisdictional limits imposed by Article III.94 Someone 
asserting only a generalized interest in constitutional governance 
lacks the “personal stake in the outcome” that courts traditionally 
require of litigants to ensure a sharpened presentation of the issues 
and to prevent parties from “utilizing the real party’s injury as an 
occasion for entry into policy-laden proceedings.”95 Indeed, even 
though Hamdi himself met Article III requirements, this was not 
enough on its own.96 Recognizing that next friend doctrine provides 
limited access to the courts for next friends, the Fourth Circuit 
concluded that there must be some “middle ground between allowing 
no one to serve as a next friend, and allowing anyone to serve.”97 The 
court was concerned about the “significant danger” that, without a 
significant relationship requirement, many litigants motivated only by 
political or policy concerns would flood the courts with next friend 
filings.98 Indeed, in this very case, a concerned citizen from New 
Jersey had filed a habeas corpus petition as Hamdi’s next friend “out 
of concern only for the unlawful nature of his incarceration.”99 The 
court, however, refused to recognize any distinction between this 
New Jersey resident and the district’s public defender, especially 
 
 91. Id. at 605. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 606. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
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given that Hamdi’s father was present in the litigation.100 Finally, the 
Fourth Circuit emphasized that, because a familial relationship 
existed here, it was not necessary to address the case of someone with 
no significant relationships at all.101 
B. Jose Padilla 
Like Hamdi, Jose Padilla was also a U.S. citizen linked to 
terrorist activity against the United States. Padilla, born in New York, 
was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigations in Chicago in 
May 2002, pursuant to a material witness warrant.102 The government 
had evidence that Padilla was in extensive contact with al Qaeda 
members and was involved in plans for possible future attacks against 
the United States and other countries.103 Initially, he was transferred 
to New York and held as a civilian under the authority of the U.S. 
Marshal Service and the Bureau of Prisons.104 Donna Newman was 
appointed as Padilla’s counsel, and, for the next several weeks, she 
conferred with Padilla, his family, and government officials.105 In June, 
the government notified the district court ex parte that the president 
had designated Padilla an enemy combatant and had directed the 
secretary of defense to take custody.106 Padilla was then transferred to 
the Consolidated Naval Brig in South Carolina.107 Two days later, 
Newman filed a habeas corpus petition on Padilla’s behalf as his next 
friend.108 
The Second Circuit had little trouble in holding that Newman 
had next friend standing to bring the habeas corpus petition. Since 
June 2002, Padilla had been held incommunicado, denied access to 
any nonmilitary personnel, including his family and Newman.109 In 
 
 100. See id. (noting the “stark contrast” between the complete “absence of a connection to 
Hamdi on which the Public Defender and Peregrim [the New Jersey resident] attempted to 
proceed” and “the close familial connection [of Hamdi’s father] that was right around the 
corner”). 
 101. Id. at 604 n.3, 606. 
 102. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 699–700 (2d Cir. 2003), rev’d, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004); 
Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 571–72 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 103. Padilla ex rel. Newman, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 572–73. 
 104. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 700. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
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addition, Newman, as his attorney, was “duty-bound” to represent 
and protect him zealously.110 In the district court, the government had 
conceded both that Padilla was inaccessible under the first prong of 
Whitmore’s test and that Newman was dedicated to his best 
interests.111 Thus, the only issue was whether Newman had a 
“significant relationship” with Padilla that was sufficient to justify her 
standing. The government relied on Hamdi112 and Coalition of 
Clergy113 in arguing that only members of Padilla’s family were able to 
sign a petition on his behalf, but the Second Circuit distinguished 
both cases on the ground that they involved would-be next friends (a 
public defender with no prior contacts with the prisoner and an ad-
hoc coalition) who had no relationship at all with the real party in 
interest.114 Although the duration of Newman’s relationship with 
Padilla had been brief, the court found that it was significant enough 
and that she was neither an “intruder” nor an “uninvited meddler.”115 
Thus, she was able to sign a habeas corpus petition on his behalf. 
C. Coalition of Clergy, Lawyers, and Professors v. Bush 
Unlike Hamdi and Padilla, Coalition of Clergy, Lawyers, and 
Professors v. Bush116 presented the issue of a real party in interest who 
has no significant relationships at all, perhaps the most difficult and 
unresolved issue of next friend standing. The petitioners were a 
“Coalition of Clergy, Lawyers, and Professors,” including three 
rabbis, a Christian pastor, ten lawyers and two journalists, who filed a 
habeas corpus petition on behalf of all “Persons Held Involuntarily at 
Guantanamo Naval Air Base, Cuba.”117 The Ninth Circuit held that 
the Coalition did not have next friend standing under Whitmore.118 On 
 
 110. Id. at 703. 
 111. Padilla ex rel. Newman, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d on 
reconsideration, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 352 F.3d 695 
(2d Cir. 2003), rev’d, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004). 
 112. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi I), 294 F.3d 598 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 113. Coalition of Clergy, Lawyers, and Professors v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002), 
cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2073 (2003). For a discussion of Coalition of Clergy, see infra Part II.C. 
 114. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 704 n.8. 
 115. Id. at 704. 
 116. 310 F.3d 1153. 
 117. Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1038 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2073 (2003). 
 118. Coalition of Clergy, 310 F.3d at 1163. The court applied its prior interpretation of 
Whitmore, elucidated in Massie ex rel. Kroll v. Woodford, 244 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2001). See 
Coalition of Clergy, 310 F.3d at 1159–60. 
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the question of accessibility, the court rejected the “hyperbolic 
argument” that the detainees were truly held “incommunicado” as 
the petition alleged.119 The detainees had been allowed to write letters 
to relatives, some had been in contact with diplomatic officials from 
their home countries, and they had been visited by the ICRC.120 
Importantly, the court found that diplomatic channels were a viable 
means of addressing the detainees’ claims and that these channels had 
remained open.121 In addition, the parents of some of the detainees 
had filed suit on behalf of their children in the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Columbia.122 Nevertheless, the detainees were unable 
to litigate their own causes because they were not allowed to meet 
with lawyers and were denied access to file on their own.123 Indeed, 
the court noted that the detainees were “held in a secure facility in an 
isolated area of the world, on a United States Naval Base in a foreign 
country, to which United States citizens are severely restricted from 
traveling.”124 However, the court declined to make any express 
holding on inaccessibility because it determined that the Coalition did 
not have standing under Whitmore’s second prong.125 
The court held that, because the Coalition had no relationship 
with any of the detainees, it could not claim next friend standing.126 In 
assessing this second prong, the court looked to whether the Coalition 
was dedicated to the detainees’ best interests and whether there was a 
“significant relationship” with the detainees. The Coalition argued 
that Whitmore did not require a significant relationship but instead 
merely suggested it as a factor.”127 The Coalition contended that a 
petitioner who was truly dedicated to the best interests of the 
detainee would satisfy the requirements under Whitmore’s second 
prong, and that a “significant relationship” should be construed only 
 
 119. Coalition of Clergy, 310 F.3d at 1160. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. That case is Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002), aff’d sub nom. Al 
Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 
2686 (2004). 
 123. Coalition of Clergy, 310 F.3d at 1161. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 1161–62. 
 126. Id. at 1163. 
 127. Id. at 1161. 
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as an “additional consideration” in assessing the appropriateness of a 
would-be next friend.128 
The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument and held that, 
consonant with prior circuit precedent, the Whitmore test should be 
understood to require a significant relationship between the would-be 
next friend and the real party in interest.129 It relied on the rationale in 
Whitmore that someone without a “significant relationship” “does not 
suffer a sufficient grievance” to confer standing, noting that such 
grievance and “injury-in-fact” requirements were necessary to 
prevent the circumvention of Article III’s limitations.130 It also 
expressed concern with “‘intruders or uninvited meddlers’”131 whose 
motives, however worthy, “run the risk of making the actual 
defendant a pawn to be manipulated on a chessboard larger than his 
own case.”132 
Although holding that a “significant relationship” was a 
requirement for next friend standing, the court recognized that the 
requirement could be relatively flexible.133 The court declined to 
define the contours of this requirement, however, describing 
 
 128. Id.; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Myth of the Liberal Ninth Circuit, 37 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1, 5–9 (2003) (explaining that neither the statute nor any case law from the Supreme Court 
or the Ninth Circuit supported the notion that a significant relationship should be required). 
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky was one of the attorneys in this litigation. 
 129. Coalition of Clergy, 310 F.3d at 1162. 
 130. Id. at 1161. The court’s rationale is problematic because it appears to confuse the 
requirements of third-party standing with those of next friend standing and assumes that a next 
friend must meet the same requirements as those of a typical third-party litigant. In general, 
Article III requires that a plaintiff establish an “injury in fact” that is concrete, distinct, and 
palpable—as opposed to abstract—and “actual or imminent.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 
149, 155 (1989) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The usual rule is that litigants must 
assert such injury to themselves and are not allowed to bring suit on behalf of third parties. 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). Exceptions to this rule have evolved, and the 
Supreme Court has set out rules for allowing third-party claims. To properly bring such a claim 
on behalf of third parties, a litigant must demonstrate (1) “she has suffered a concrete, 
redressable injury,” (2) “she has a close relation with the third party,” and (3) there is “some 
hindrance to the third party’s ability to protect his or her own interests.” Edmonson v. Leesville 
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 629 (1991). Next friend standing is a type of third-party standing but 
is unique in its history and underlying purpose. In most third-party claims, litigants seek to 
redress their own injuries by asserting the rights of third parties, whereas in next friend claims, 
the next friends have no injuries of their own and only assert the real parties’ rights. It is 
possible that the Coalition of Clergy court failed to see this distinction and was conflating the 
“best interests/significant relationship” prong with the injury-in-fact requirements of other 
third-party claims. 
 131. Coalition of Clergy, 310 F.3d at 1161 (quoting Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 164). 
 132. Id. (quoting Lenhard v. Wolff, 443 U.S. 1306, 1312 (1979)). 
 133. Id. at 1162. 
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“significance” as a “relative concept, dependent on the individual 
prisoner’s plight.”134 It explained that a detainee who had no relatives, 
friends, or diplomatic officials willing or able to petition on his behalf 
could be represented by “a person with ‘some’ relationship conveying 
some modicum of authority or consent, ‘significant’ in comparison to 
the detainee’s other relationships.”135 “Some” relationship could be 
“an objective basis for discerning the ‘intruder’ or ‘uninvited meddler’ 
from the true ‘next friend.’”136 Here, however, the Coalition members 
had no relationships at all with the detainees and had not attempted 
to establish any.137 Although it was possible that some situations 
would warrant relaxing the Whitmore requirement of an actual 
relationship, the court did not see this as such a situation.138 
In contrast to the Coalition of Clergy majority, Judge Marsha 
Berzon, in her concurrence, disagreed that a significant relationship 
was required under Whitmore.139 Judge Berzon pointed out that the 
Supreme Court stated the rule as containing two requirements: (1) 
that the real party in interest is unable to litigate his own cause, and 
(2) that the would-be next friend is “truly dedicated” to the prisoner’s 
best interests.140 Only after delineating this rule did the Supreme 
Court state that the case law “suggested” the requirement of a 
“significant relationship.”141 Judge Berzon argued that subsequent 
Ninth Circuit cases were not decided on the basis of Whitmore’s 
second prong, and so any language indicating that a significant 
relationship was required “was simply dicta.”142 Additionally, the 
present case did not require any holding that a significant relationship 
was either required or was only one of many considerations, because 
under any analysis the Coalition had not demonstrated that it would 
best serve the detainees’ interests.143 Although direct communication 
 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 1166 (Berzon, J., concurring). 
 140. Id. at 1165 (Berzon, J., concurring). 
 141. Id.; see also Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163–64 (“[T]he ‘next friend’ must be truly dedicated 
to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate, and it has been further 
suggested that the ‘next friend’ must have some significant relationship with the real party in 
interest.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 142. Coalition of Clergy, 310 F.3d at 1166 (Berzon, J., concurring). 
 143. Id. at 1166–67 (Berzon, J., concurring). 
BELK FINAL.DOC 2/9/2005  11:05 AM 
2004] NEXT FRIEND STANDING 1767 
with the prisoners was not required, “the complete lack of any attempt 
to communicate counsel[ed] against next friend standing.”144 
Additionally, the “ad-hoc” nature of the Coalition worked against 
it.145 An organization with a history of helping people in similar 
situations, such as Amnesty International or the ICRC, would have 
stood in a much stronger position.146 Finally, in other cases, such as 
Rasul v. Bush,147 the litigants’ claims addressed concerns shared by all 
of the Guantanamo Bay detainees.148 The interests of the Rasul 
detainees and their next friend family members were so closely in line 
with the interests of the remainder of the detainees that, for the time 
being, there was no need for another “next friend” to litigate common 
threshold issues. 
D. The Significance of the Three Military Cases 
As Hamdi, Padilla, and Coalition of Clergy demonstrate, a U.S. 
citizen held as an enemy combatant is “inaccessible.” In the Hamdi 
and Padilla cases, U.S. citizens held incommunicado by the military 
met the first prong of the Whitmore test. It was clear in both cases 
that the real party in interest was unable to litigate his own claim. The 
Coalition of Clergy court was confronted with the more difficult 
situation of alien detainees with limited outside contact, and it 
declined to make any express holding on inaccessibility. 
In these military cases, courts have split on what is required to 
meet the second prong of Whitmore that the would-be next friend be 
qualified to bring the petition. Hamdi presented a typical situation of 
a parent filing on behalf of a child, and Padilla concerned another 
common circumstance of an attorney, already on the case, filing on 
behalf of her client. In both cases, no one doubted that the next 
friends were acting in the best interests of the prisoners or that Esam 
Hamdi and Donna Newman were appropriate choices within the 
 
 144. Id. at 1167 (Berzon, J., concurring). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002), aff’d sub nom. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 
1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). In Rasul v. Bush, the 
parents of Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal, and David Hicks brought habeas corpus petitions on behalf 
of their children held at Guantanamo Bay. Rasul and Iqbal were citizens of the United 
Kingdom, and Hicks was an Australian citizen. Rasul, 215 F. Supp. at 57. In the related case of 
Al Odah v. United States, family members brought habeas petitions on behalf of twelve Kuwaiti 
nationals also held at Guantanamo Bay. Id. at 58.  
 148. Coalition of Clergy, 310 F.3d at 1167–68 (Berzon, J., concurring). 
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prisoners’ circles of relationships. Although Frank Dunham, the 
public defender in Hamdi’s case, was not allowed to proceed as next 
friend, it was likely the availability of a closer next friend—Hamdi’s 
father—that was driving the court’s decision.149 The Padilla court 
recognized that close relatives were not necessarily the only potential 
litigants, but this merely affirmed prior opinions indicating that a 
prisoner’s attorney, even one appointed by the court, would be well-
suited to the job.150 The Coalition of Clergy case presented the most 
difficult situation—a detainee with no relationships at all.151 
This Note address two questions that the cases left open: (1) for 
noncitizens and nonresidents, should any situation short of being held 
completely incommunicado by the military warrant a finding of 
inaccessibility; and (2) under Whitmore, is a significant relationship 
between a next friend and a detainee required? 
III.  THE FIRST PRONG OF THE WHITMORE TEST:  
WHEN IS A PERSON UNABLE TO SUE? 
The first prong of the two-prong Whitmore test requires that the 
would-be next friend “provide an adequate explanation . . . why the 
real party in interest cannot appear on his own behalf to prosecute 
the action.”152 This prong requires courts to consider whether real 
parties in interest are unable to sue, that is, whether they lack 
meaningful access to the courts to vindicate their own rights. 
Although a few of the Guantanamo Bay detainees have other 
means of securing relief, the most important being diplomatic 
channels,153 most have no comparable available alternatives.154 
 
 149. Arguably, the claims of both Dunham and Hamdi’s father made it a simple matter to 
throw out the petition of the concerned New Jersey resident. 
 150. Even Justice William Rehnquist, now Chief Justice, noted that “from a purely technical 
standpoint a public defender may appear as ‘next friend’ with as much justification as the 
mother of [a prisoner].” Lenhard v. Wolff, 443 U.S. 1306, 1310 (1979); see also, e.g., Hauser ex 
rel. Crawford v. Moore, 223 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2000) (explaining that for the particular 
prisoner “the most logical next friend is [the prisoner’s] court-appointed counsel”). 
 151. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi I), 294 F.3d 598, 604 n.3 (4th Cir. 2002) (“In holding a 
significant relationship to be a requirement for next friend standing, we reserve the case of 
someone who possesses no significant relationships at all.”). 
 152. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163 (1990). 
 153. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 154. See Chemerinsky, supra note 128, at 8–9 (2003) (arguing that because the Guantanamo 
Bay detainees are from foreign nations, probably do not speak English, and have been refused 
any means of communication with courts or attorneys, it is preposterous to think they have 
voluntarily chosen not to file lawsuits). 
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Especially given that the United States maintains significant control 
over Afghanistan and Iraq, and thus can influence their diplomatic 
channels, it would be unjust to treat Afghani and Iraqi detainees the 
same as, for example, Australian or Kuwaiti citizens. In particular, the 
U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq should be considered in 
assessing whether Afghani and Iraqi detainees at Guantanamo Bay 
are able to vindicate their own rights. There may be other, particular 
circumstances worthy of consideration, but because the military has 
not released the names of any of the prisoners,155 it is difficult to make 
individual assessments. 
A. The Meaning of Inaccessibility 
Recent cases have questioned whether nonresident aliens held 
outside the United States are truly inaccessible. In Coalition of 
Clergy, the detainees were “denied access to file petitions in United 
States courts on their own behalf,”156 but the court still questioned 
whether the detainees were really “inaccessible” because they had 
had limited contact with the ICRC, diplomatic officials, and 
relatives.157 The District Court for the District of Columbia has also 
questioned the inaccessibility of the same Guantanamo detainees. In 
Rasul v. Bush, where the family members of several detainees 
petitioned for habeas corpus relief, the court pointed out “the notion 
that these aliens could be held incommunicado from the rest of the 
world would appear to be inaccurate.”158 The court cited evidence that 
the Australian government had been in contact with David Hicks, 
one of the detainees.159 
So long as detained nonresident enemy aliens have access to 
some relief—be it a federal court, a military tribunal, or some 
diplomatic avenue—they do not have a disability that warrants third-
party interference. Indeed, in Coalition of Clergy, the court 
determined that inaccessibility was in doubt, even though the 
government had admitted the detainees were prevented from 
accessing the courts. Although it is clear that these detainees lack 
access to civilian courts, the recent opinions have shown a willingness 
 
 155. Id. at 9. 
 156. 310 F.3d at 1164. 
 157. Id. at 1160. 
 158. Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002), aff’d sub nom. Al Odah v. United 
States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). 
 159. Id. at 57 n.1. 
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to look to other possible avenues of relief in assessing their true 
“inaccessibility.” 
 The courts’ treatment of this issue relies, in part, on the recently 
invalidated notion that access to the domestic courts is an entitlement 
of citizenship. The definition of “access” in these opinions is tied up 
with questions of whether a person should have access to the civilian 
courts and, if so, what level of access the person ought to have. There 
has been substantial revision of Supreme Court authority on this since 
the cases discussed here were decided. In June 2004, in Rasul v. 
Bush,160 the Supreme Court affirmed that all persons detained by the 
United States have the ability to challenge their custody before the 
judicial branch. Before Rasul, controlling precedent in Johnson v. 
Eisentrager161 denied any right of access to the domestic courts for 
nonresident enemy aliens.162 In Rasul, the Court distinguished 
Eisentrager from the Guantanamo Bay situation because the 
detainees in Cuba were “not nationals of countries at war with the 
United States,” denied any “acts of aggression against the United 
States[,] . . . [had] never been afforded access to any tribunal[,] . . . 
and for more than two years [had] been imprisoned in territory over 
which the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and 
control.”163 In addition, Eisentrager may have been relevant to the 
“prisoners’ constitutional entitlement to habeas corpus” but did not 
control statutory entitlement.164 Thus, nonresident enemy aliens are 
no longer precluded from invoking federal court jurisdiction under 
the habeas corpus statute, and a prisoner’s status as an alien or a 
citizen is no longer controlling.165 
 
 160. 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). 
 161. 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
 162. Id. at 781. The petitioners in Eisentrager had been tried and convicted in China by a 
military commission and were imprisoned in Germany. Id. at 765–66. Several factors were 
important to the Court’s holding: concerns that bringing the petitioners before a domestic court 
might burden the military; the petitioners had never been inside the U.S.; the acts for which they 
had been tried and convicted were committed abroad; and the potential for allowing enemies to 
create a conflict between the civil and military courts. Id. at 778–79. 
 163. 124 S. Ct. at 2693. 
 164. Id. Since Eisentrager, the Court had overturned precedent concerning the statutory 
authorization for habeas corpus jurisdiction upon which it relied in Eisentrager, and so the case 
no longer could be regarded as rejecting the ability of a court to exercise jurisdiction over these 
claims. Id. at 2695. 
 165. See id. at 2696 (“Aliens held at the base, no less than American citizens, are entitled to 
invoke the federal courts’ authority.”). 
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B. The Guantanamo Bay Detainees 
Although some of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay have had 
the benefit of relatives’ and diplomats’ intervention on their behalves, 
the mere fact that the detainment has continued for so long suggests 
that, practically speaking, virtually all of the detainees have no 
avenues of securing relief.166 Although the U.S. government has 
spoken publicly about its intent to review each prisoner’s status,167 it 
has only in the last few months identified the first six inmates who will 
stand trial.168 It is only after the Supreme Court affirmed that the 
detainees could challenge their imprisonment in the courts that the 
military initiated administrative hearings to determine the validity of 
each prisoner’s status as an enemy combatant.169 The detainees 
continue to be denied access to lawyers,170 and the Bush 
Administration asserts it may hold them until the war on terror ends, 
which may never happen.171 
In addition to the circumstances of their detention, the Afghani 
and Iraqi prisoners face another obstacle. They are in a difficult 
bargaining position against the United States. Although the U.S. 
government has been working with the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the United Nations to restore a viable 
Afghani government to power, Afghanistan is still largely under U.S. 
control.172 Iraq is still dependent on the U.S. military as it strives to 
 
 166. Certainly, if they had some means of challenging their custody they would have done 
so. Although Judge Berzon’s concurrence in Coalition of Clergy listed organizations that she 
would deem qualified to bring suit on behalf of the detainees as a group, such as the ICRC or 
Amnesty International, no such organizations had done so. One commentator took Judge 
Berzon to task for her analysis, stating, “[T]he absence of any lawsuit by the vast majority of 
[the Guantanamo Bay prisoners] shows the flaw in Judge Berzon’s argument. Why would those 
detainees in cages bring no challenge? Certainly it is not that they are pleased with their 
captivity.” Chemerinsky, supra note 128, at 8. 
 167. Guantanamo Prisoners to Get Reviews; Rumsfeld says a panel will consider the threat 
posed by each detainee on an annual basis, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2004, at A29.  
 168. Horrock & Iqbal, supra note 2. Military tribunals have been authorized for two Britons, 
an Australian, and three unnamed detainees. Id. 
 169. Two Guantanamo Detainees Challenge ‘Enemy Combatant’ Status, AGENCE FRANCE 
PRESSE, Aug. 2, 2004, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Agence France Presse File. 
 170. The detainees will be provided with “personal representatives,” who will provide 
assistance but will not function as advocates. Any statements made to a personal representative 
may be used against the detainee. Id.; Edmonson, supra note 2. 
 171. Toni Locy, Human Rights Groups Denied Seats at Tribunals; Space Is Limited, 
Pentagon Says, USA TODAY, Feb. 24, 2004, at A3. 
 172. See Tim McGirk, Terrorism’s Harvest, TIME AUSTRALIA, Aug. 9, 2004 (noting that 
there are twenty thousand U.S. troops in Afghanistan); Fareed Zakaria, Warlords, Drugs and 
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rebuild itself.173 The relationship the United States has with 
Afghanistan and Iraq suggests that Afghani and Iraqi detainees lack 
diplomatic officials able to fight the U.S. government on their 
behalves. It is also unlikely, practically speaking, that any relatives 
whom the detainees might have in their home countries could litigate 
for them in U.S. courts. Both Iraq and Afghanistan remain dangerous 
and unstable.174 Regardless of whether a few of these prisoners have 
been able to secure some mode of redress, the courts should find the 
remaining majority, especially the Afghani and Iraqi detainees over 
whom the United States has the most control, “inaccessible” under 
Whitmore’s first prong. 
There are further reasons for finding inaccessibility. The goal of 
next friend standing is to allow the adjudication of habeas corpus 
petitions on the merits. If a court had decided to hear these cases on 
the merits, it would have afforded the detainees an opportunity to 
hear the charges against them, consult with counsel, perhaps refute 
the government’s evidence,175 and in some cases publicly proclaim 
their innocence.176 Importantly, it would have given them a chance to 
bring their situation to light before an impartial tribunal, as well as 
furnishing some hope of clarifying their legal status. Denying the 
 
Votes; Drugs Have Become the Dominating Feature of Afghanistan’s Economy, and Corruption 
Has Infected Every Aspect of Afghan Political Life, NEWSWEEK INT’L, Aug. 9, 2004, at 39 
(describing the substantial effects of U.S. government policy on the stability of Afghanistan). 
 173. See UK’s Hoon Says NATO Mission Key for Coalition Troops Iraq Exit Strategy, 
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 13, 2004, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Agence France Presse File 
(quoting a British defense official as saying that the U.S.-led forces’ “exit strategy is dependent 
on the ability of the Iraqis to organize their own security”); see also Worse Than the Usual Bad, 
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004 at B10 (noting that the U.S. still maintains 140,000 troops in Iraq). 
 174. See Carlotta Gill, Humanitarian Aid Group Abandons Afghan Effort, HOUSTON 
CHRONICLE, July 29, 2004, at 22 (reporting that the international aid agency Médecins Sans 
Frontières was pulling out of Afghanistan after twenty-four years, citing government failure to 
take proper action after the killings of five of its workers and the high risk of future attacks); 
Road Show Observer, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2004, at 12 (“[H]alf of Afghanistan’s population . . . 
lives in severe poverty.”). Much of the south and east of the country is considered “off limits” 
even to aid workers. Gill, supra. Regarding the dangers in Iraq, see, e.g., Dexter Filkins, 2 
Bombers Kill 5 in Guarded Area in Baghdad, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2004, at A1; Edward Wong, 
Rebels Kidnap 2 Americans and a Briton in Baghdad, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2004 at A11.   
 175. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002) (“Plaintiffs . . . ask . . . to 
‘meet with their families,’ ‘be informed of the charges, if any, against them,’ ‘designate and 
consult with counsel of their choice,’ and ‘have access to the courts or some other impartial 
tribunal.’”), aff’d sub nom. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev’d sub 
nom. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). 
 176. Id. at 63 (“Plaintiffs have told the Court that they seek access to an impartial tribunal in 
order to ‘expeditiously establish their innocence and be able to return to Kuwait and their 
families.’”). 
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filing of a petition dismisses the case on a technical issue and resolves 
nothing. Review on the merits here is also compelling because of the 
undefined nature of the war on terror. The congressional 
authorization for the use of force177 is open-ended. There is no 
definable end point to the conflict and no closing event that could 
mark the point at which the Guantanamo Bay detainees will be no 
longer needed for questioning. 
Next friend standing in habeas corpus review is fundamentally a 
procedure to ensure that someone can challenge government action. 
Its role is to guarantee that the government has followed due process 
of law—any law, whether civilian or military, domestic or 
international—and that it has some good reason to hold a party in 
custody. It is an ancient check on a government’s power to capture 
and detain, which is the ultimate abrogation of individual rights. A 
stronger standard of “access” is called for when it becomes obvious 
that the detaining government not only holds custody of an individual 
but also controls all other viable means of securing relief. The role of 
the United States in detaining men at Guantanamo Bay and the level 
of control that the U.S. has over the detainees’ alternate means of 
securing relief should have been considered in determining whether 
they were able to litigate their own causes. 
IV.  THE SECOND PRONG OF THE WHITMORE TEST:  
HOW SHOULD A NEXT FRIEND BE CHOSEN? 
Under Whitmore’s second requirement for next friend standing, 
the would-be next friend “must be truly dedicated to the best 
interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate, and it has 
been further suggested that a ‘next friend’ must have some significant 
relationship with the real party in interest.”178 The desire to avoid 
giving standing to intruders or uninvited meddlers is an important 
factor in assessing this prong.179 The issue is whether a “significant 
 
 177. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. Law No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
 178. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163–64 (1990) (citation omitted). 
 179. See, e.g., Hauser ex rel. Crawford v. Moore, 223 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting 
“reservations” that the prisoner’s would-be next friends were not acting in his best interests but 
only out of “their own desires to block imposition of the death penalty in an ‘attempt to define 
justice as they [saw] fit’”); United States ex rel. Bryant v. Houston, 273 F. 915, 917 (2d Cir. 1921) 
(affirming the dismissal of a habeas corpus application for failure to show that the real party in 
interest “authorized or desired” it); In re Poole, 9 D.C. (2 MacArth.) 583, 590 (D.C. 1876) 
(discussing the invalidity of the habeas proceedings because the petitioner was “a mere stranger 
to the infant” and was not invited by the child, a parent, or a guardian to bring the writ). 
BELK FINAL.DOC 2/9/2005  11:05 AM 
1774 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:1747 
relationship” is required between the next friend and the real party in 
interest (as the Hamdi and Coalition of Clergy courts held), or 
whether, as this Note argues, the existence or nonexistence of a 
significant relationship is merely one factor among many to consider 
in assessing whether a would-be next friend is “truly dedicated.”180 In 
practice, the facts of each case often determine the most relevant 
considerations. 
A. For Most Courts, Whitmore’s Second Prong Involves a Case-by-
Case, Factual Analysis 
In practice, courts are likely to assess each would-be next friend 
on the facts of each situation. The courts consistently approve next 
friend status for next friends with objectively observable relationships 
with the real parties in interest. Often this is a family relationship, but 
it may also be appointed or hired counsel.181 In many cases, this type 
of significant relationship, especially a family relationship, is an 
obvious indicator of a would-be next friend’s good faith and 
appropriateness. 
There is often no need for skepticism when a family relationship 
exists; some family members, however, may have only a generalized 
interest in a case. For example, in Hauser ex rel. Crawford v. Moore, 
the Eleventh Circuit questioned whether a birth mother who had 
given up a prison inmate for adoption and had no prior involvement 
in the case was truly dedicated to the prisoner’s best interests.182 Both 
the court and the inmate believed the petitioner’s motivations were 
based on her personal views of the death penalty, rather than on 
concerns about justice for the prisoner.183 Similarly, in Davis v. 
 
 180. It is also important to remember that the “true dedication” requirement of next friend 
standing doctrine is not the same as the personal injury requirement of Article III standing. See 
supra note 130 and Part I.B. 
 181. See, e.g., Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 721 (1986) (permitting without question a 
private attorney), replaced by Jeff D. v. Andrus, 899 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1989); United States ex 
rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 13 n.3 (1955) (sister); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi I), 294 F.3d 
598, 600 n.1 (4th Cir. 2002) (father); Vargas v. Lambert, 159 F.3d 1161, 1168 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(mother); Warren v. Cardwell, 621 F.2d 319, 321 n.1 (9th Cir. 1980) (hired counsel); Ex parte 
Zimmerman, 132 F.2d 442, 443 (9th Cir. 1942) (wife); Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. 
Supp. 2d 564, 578 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (appointed counsel), aff’d on reconsideration, 243 F. Supp. 2d 
42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev’d, 124 S. Ct. 
2711 (2004). 
 182. Hauser, 223 F.3d at 1322. 
 183. Id. For an extreme example, see Gardner v. Green, Civil Action 99-0246-RV-S, 1999 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10206 (S.D. Ala. May 17, 1999), adopted by Civil Action 99-0246-RV-S, 1999 
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Austin,184 a Georgia district court found that the prisoner’s minister 
and first cousin did not have a sufficient relationship with him to 
confer standing.185 The court based its finding on the minister’s and 
cousin’s lack of involvement with the inmate during his adult life 
prior to his conviction, which made their status similar to that of 
anyone who becomes personally involved in a particular case because 
of a philosophical opposition to capital punishment.186 In addition to 
family members who have only a generalized or theoretical interest, 
some family members have interests in direct conflict with those of a 
confined person187 or simply fail to act in the party’s best interests.188 
In short, the existence of a relationship generally creates a 
presumption of standing that may be rebutted by other information. 
If a family member seems to have only a generalized interest in the 
case, or if it appears that the family member’s personal interests may 
conflict with those of the real party in interest, next friend standing 
will be denied. Although having a family relationship, or being hired 
or appointed as counsel, may be strong evidence of the “best 
interests” prong, in practice most courts are willing to look at other 
evidence. 
B. The Test Should Not Require a Significant Relationship 
The analysis under Whitmore’s second prong should not require 
a significant relationship. A reading of the plain language of 
Whitmore indicates that an appropriate next friend is someone acting 
in good faith and in the best interests of the detainee. Judge Berzon’s 
 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10202 (S.D. Ala. June 8, 1999). A mentally incompetent adult was removed 
from her mother’s home by police and sent to an adult foster home. The home in which the 
mother and daughter were living had been partly destroyed by fire and was determined 
uninhabitable. Additionally, police found the daughter locked inside the home by chains that 
had been wrapped around the house several times and padlocked from the outside. Id. at *4. 
The mother filed a habeas corpus petition on behalf of her daughter, but the court held, in part, 
that she did not meet the best interests prong of the Whitmore test. Id. at *8–9. 
 184. 492 F. Supp. 273, 275–76 (N.D. Ga. 1980). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See, e.g., In re Hop, 623 P.2d 282, 285 (Cal. 1981) (applying state law to hold that a 
public defender had next friend standing to challenge the family’s placement of a mentally 
incompetent adult in a restrictive hospital facility). 
 188. See, e.g., McCraney v. Boyd, Civil Action 95-0383-BH-M, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9111, 
at *6 (S.D. Ala. May 30, 1995) (denying a husband’s standing to file a habeas petition on his 
wife’s behalf because he was acting inconsistently and was “not committed to [her] best 
interests”). 
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concurrence in Coalition of Clergy stated that the language used by 
the Whitmore court in describing the second prong of its test did not 
make a “significant relationship” a requirement but merely stated it 
as an additional consideration.189 This analysis is correct. The Supreme 
Court described a “significant relationship” as a “suggestion” and did 
not incorporate it into the rule.190 A significant relationship is more 
appropriately read as an objective indicator of good faith and true 
dedication, and as evidence of actual authorization by the real party 
in interest to have the would-be next friend act as his agent in court. 
Even under the majority’s decision in Coalition of Clergy, the 
test for “significance” is so fluid that, as a would-be next friend 
departs further and further from the traditional scenario of a close 
relative, the analysis increasingly turns into a fact-based inquiry. 
Having held that a “significant relationship” was required, Coalition 
of Clergy treated the contours of the requirement as subjective, 
changing with the circumstances of each detainee.191 The requirement 
would also apply only very loosely to detainees with no relatives, 
friends, or diplomats able to act on their behalves. In such cases, the 
Coalition of Clergy court said that only “some” relationship would be 
necessary—one which would be “significant” only when compared to 
a detainee’s other relationships.192 
A major concern for the Ninth Circuit, and for all courts that 
have addressed this issue, is the need for some relationship to serve as 
an objective indicator of who might be an “intruder or uninvited 
meddler” posing as a next friend. An intruder or uninvited meddler—
someone with only a generalized interest in the case—would be 
inappropriate because of Article III concerns and because of her 
inability to prosecute the case in a manner serving the best interests 
of the detainee (as opposed to serving a larger political cause). This 
concern is entirely valid, and the Coalition of Clergy court was correct 
in finding that the particular litigants in that case were waging a 
political battle in the courts. Nevertheless, their fight was in the best 
interests of at least some of the detainees. 
 
 189. 310 F.3d 1153, 1165 (9th Cir. 2002) (Berzon, J., concurring), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2073 
(2003). 
 190. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163–64 (1990) (“[T]he ‘next friend’ must be 
truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate . . . and it 
has been further suggested that a ‘next friend’ must have some significant relationship with the 
real party in interest.” (citation omitted)). 
 191. 310 F.3d at 1162. 
 192. Id. 
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Given the facts of Coalition of Clergy, the court did not have to 
rule that a significant relationship was required. The real issue in that 
case was that the Coalition had filed on behalf of all detainees, 
including those who were already represented in other actions or who 
may have preferred to pursue diplomatic channels over judicial ones. 
The prospect of duplicative or unwelcome litigation did not sit well 
with the Ninth Circuit, and rightly so. Had the Coalition been able to 
limit its petition to those detainees with no other avenues for relief, 
perhaps by filing an anonymous petition limited to the detainees from 
certain countries, the petition should have been allowed and the case 
should have been heard on the merits, despite the absence of any 
relationship with the detainees. After all, it must be remembered that 
the government transferred the detainees to a naval base in Cuba, a 
place where U.S. citizens face severe travel restrictions and where 
attorneys were very publicly denied access to the prisoners.193 Any 
attempt at creating a relationship would have been futile. 
The doctrine of next friend standing gives access, not merely to 
the next friend, but to the detained person. The requirements of 
Article III should and do apply with full rigor to the real party in 
interest. The next friend, however, is a mere surrogate, and turning 
away the next friend actually closes the door on the real party in 
interest. In determining whether to allow next friend standing, courts 
should focus on whether the would-be next friend plays a legitimate 
role in bringing the claim on the prisoner’s behalf. 
The existence of a significant relationship should be just one 
factor for consideration in assessing a would-be next friend. A third 
party with no objectively identifiable relationship, then, would have a 
heavier burden in establishing the appropriateness of next friend 
standing. A significant relationship requirement would effectively 
preclude anyone from even trying to meet the burden for detainees 
like those at Guantanamo Bay. The Hamdi and Coalition of Clergy 
courts held that lack of a significant relationship was evidence of an 
“intruder” or “uninvited meddler.”194 A better rule is that, although a 
significant relationship may evidence good faith and appropriateness, 
 
 193. See Chemerinsky, supra note 128, at 9 (outlining the impediments preventing attorneys 
or other individuals from contacting the prisoners); Horrock & Iqbal, supra note 2 (reporting 
that the detainees are held “without access to family, friends or legal counsel”). 
 194. Coalition of Clergy, 310 F.3d at 1162; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi I), 294 F.3d 598, 606–
07 (4th Cir. 2002). 
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the lack of such a relationship means only that the would-be next 
friend continues to bear the burden of establishing her standing. 
CONCLUSION 
Fundamentally, next friend standing is about granting an 
individual access to the courts when access is most difficult to obtain 
and yet also most needed. When a would-be next friend is denied 
standing, the detained person may lose his only option for gaining 
access to an impartial review of his confinement. The device of next 
friend standing was created in the context of habeas corpus to allow 
more prisoners to seek judicial process. Especially for cases in which 
the original purposes of the Great Writ are at stake, the device of 
next friend standing should not be used to deny access. In these 
situations, the courts are called upon to ensure the rights of 
individuals deprived of the most basic freedom in Anglo-American 
law—freedom from unlawful governmental restraint. In these cases, 
the courts should remain available to hear petitioners’ arguments on 
the merits. The ultimate decision should be based not on a 
technicality surrounding standing, but on a meaningful consideration 
of the claim. 
To this end, the federal courts should consider the context of 
military detainees’ situations when reviewing habeas corpus petitions 
brought on their behalves. Two considerations are important. First, in 
assessing a detainee’s inaccessibility, the role of the military in taking 
custody and in undermining other avenues of relief should favor a 
finding of inaccessibility. Second, in analyzing a would-be next 
friend’s appropriateness to act on a prisoner’s behalf, the courts 
should conduct a case-by-case assessment of whether the would-be 
next friend is truly dedicated to the prisoner’s best interests. The 
existence of an objectively identifiable relationship between the 
prisoner and the would-be next friend should be treated as only one 
factor in making this assessment. 
